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The Politics of Mobilising for Gender Justice in Egypt from Mubarak  
to Morsi and Beyond 
 
Mariz Tadros 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper examines the nature of the political struggle over the status, role and identity of 
women in Egypt in between the two revolutions (January 2011 and June 2013). It presents a 
situational analysis of the various actors, relations and agendas that have both informed the 
backlash against women’s rights and the mass movements of resistance. It acknowledges 
that while women’s rights have historically suffered as a consequence of a hostile political 
will of the ruling authority and parts of political and civil society that are inimical to expanding 
women’s rights (and sometimes mobilise around revoking what already exists), women’s 
rights faced new threats after January 2011 because of the political settlement between the 
Supreme Council for Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. The threats to women’s 
rights worsened under President Morsi’s regime and while they were not the prime reason 
why women mobilised in the largest numbers ever to oust the president in June 2013, 
encroachments on their freedoms was a catalysing factor.  
 
The paper’s principle argument is that while a constellation of factors influence prospects of 
advancing women’s equality in Egypt, collective action matters both for policy and for 
building constituencies that grant legitimacy to the cause being championed. The 
fragmentation and internal rivalry that characterised the myriad civil society organisations 
and coalitions during Mubarak’s reign left advocates of gender equality unequipped to exploit 
the (few) opportunities of influencing the political configuration of power after the revolution of 
2011. The threats to women’s rights thereafter propelled old and newly formed non-state 
actors into a mass mobilisation of resistance. This represented a case where collective 
action in its various forms succeeded in challenging the status quo in critical ways. However, 
the political polarisation between supporters and opponents of the outcome of the 30 June 
revolution has led to a de-collectivisation of efforts. If the opportunities for influence are to be 
seized, and threats to influencing a progressive gender agenda challenged in the next phase, 
prioritising local pathways of re-building and strengthening collective action is of primary 
importance.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper is about the nature of mobilisation around gender issues during the last ten years, 
in particular in the period in between Egypt’s two revolutions (January 2011 and June 2013) 
and the immediate aftermath. It presents a situational analysis of the key actors, issues and 
networks through which gender agendas are mediated. ‘Gender agendas’ is loosely defined 
to mean political projects of how power relations between men and women should be 
organised in politics and society. Gender agendas are important not only because they have 
a bearing on women’s agency, status and roles but also in view of what they tell us about 
contending notions of group, national and supra-national identity (Mohanty 1991). The extent 
to which gender equality factors in national policy also has a bearing on the human 
development trajectory of a country (UNFPA 2000) and its democratisation, in terms of its 
inclusiveness and recognition of its citizenry (Whaites 2008: 10).  
 
The paper specifically examines the nature of collective mobilisation by non-state actors who 
champion gender equality, and what influences the nature of their agency and their 
prospects of influence. The rationale for focusing on collective actors that work on advancing 
gender equality stems from two critical factors. First, the period under study in Egypt 
between January 2011-June 2013 is one characterised by a political culture of exceptional 
collective activism around various political, economic and social agendas - and gender 
issues are no exception. Second, there is a consensus established in scholarly literature 
around the importance of collective action for eliciting positive social change in gender issues 
(Basu 2013; Waylen 2007; Weldon and Htun 2013; Cornwall 2012). This stance is however, 
qualified, since there have been instances in history where positive change has materialised 
through a top-down approach initiated by the government. Further, not all collective action 
around gender issues is informed by the normative values of women’s equality. Some of the 
largest and most successful occurrences of mobilisation around gender issues witnessed in 
the Arab world have been in support of agendas whose aim is ultimately to curb women’s 
rights. However, the paper argues that the strength and cohesion of collective action to 
demand more rights for women has a direct bearing on whether all opportunities for 
influencing the politics of gender are exploited to challenge power configurations on a 
grassroots and macro level. 
 
While the paper briefly highlights some of the dimensions of the struggles for gender matters 
during Mubarak’s reign, the focus is mainly on the period in between the two revolutions. 
This period is exceptional in every way - red lines have been challenged, political absolutes 
have been contested, and citizens have mobilised en masse around just about everything 
from water shortages to political repression. While this paper seeks to contextualise the 
struggles over influencing gender issues however, due to space constraints, it does not 
present a historicised narrative of the origins of these divisions and demarcations. It also 
does not present an analysis of gender discourses nor oral narratives that are critical for 
uncovering the pervasiveness of power dynamics in times of extreme volatility. They are 
perhaps best dealt with elsewhere, not due to their irrelevance but to space restrictions.  
 
Finally, the paper is influenced by the author’s own standpoint on gender issues. This 
standpoint is informed by a recognition of the necessity of understanding contending visions 
of gender justice, the power dynamics behind them and the sources of their appeal and 
changing context. However, gender justice here is informed by a normative belief in the 
importance of not only increasing the choices available to women and men to assume more 
egalitarian gender roles, but also to expose and address the underlying power dynamics that 
influence their own conceptions and perceptions of themselves and the choices available to 
them. In other words,  conceptions of gender justice that are based on rigidly defined gender 
roles emanating from biological differences are considered here as restricting not only choice 
but people’s own consciousness of the possible and conceivable.  
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The paper is a synthesis of many different research initiatives that have been undertaken by 
the author over the years. Different sections have been informed by different methodological 
approaches. In most cases, the methodology has involved a combination of qualitative 
research methods such as interviews and focus groups with ethnographic approaches based 
on participant observation and case study.  
 
The paper is structured according to the chronological order of historical phases in which 
Egypt was ruled by different leadership. The first part sets out the interface between 
authoritarian rule in Mubarak’s reign and the various state, semi-state and non-state actors 
which influenced the gender agenda, and the power relations between them. This is followed 
by an examination of what the 25 January revolution meant for collective struggles around 
gender issues, and how the rupture in the organisation of power in politics and society 
unleashed one of the worst backlashes against women’s rights in the contemporary history of 
Egypt, but also generated various expressions of resistance, of an individual and collective 
form. The third part of the paper discusses the power struggles over the gender agenda 
during Morsi’s reign, from above in multiple spaces: the constituent assembly, the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and national machineries; and the disconnects 
over perceptions of women’s realities from below. The second revolution and its immediate 
aftermath are briefly discussed in part four of the paper, in terms of the power configurations 
from above, and the deepening divisions in society from below. Finally, the conclusions are 
followed by a set of policy messages for donors and external policy influencing circles 
committed to supporting gender equality and non-state actors working in Egypt. 
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1  Conceptual framing 
 
The paper seeks to adopt a contextualised approach to analysing collective action around 
gender issues, recognising that critical junctures also need to be examined as interjections 
along a historical continuum. Consequently, the approach here is to revisit the conceptual 
framework for examining collective action to endorse women’s rights in the last years of 
Mubarak’s rule and assess the extent to which the determinants of the formation of initiatives 
have changed, along with the ruptures experienced in the status quo. A framework was 
inductively developed to explain the emergence, and success and failure of coalitions as 
forms of collective action, grounded in an analysis of six coalitions in Egypt and Jordan. The 
factors determined particularly relevant for the analysis of the emergence of collective action 
included: 
  
 The trigger, political opportunity and ability to respond 
 The leadership and the networks that sustain it 
 The issue and its framing 
 The external linkages and outmanoeuvring internal opposition 
 
An examination of the changes that occurred in Egypt in collective action around gender 
issues suggests that the way in which these factors affect the mobilisation of people in 
collective action changed. In pre-revolutionary Egypt, triggers – occurrences or incidents - 
that catalysed people into collective action were few. Political opportunity, which refers to the 
extent to which an environment is enabling for collective action and the extent to which the 
political moment opens or closes new opportunities for organising, is a particularly important 
factor in the Egyptian context because during Mubarak’s reign, political openings were 
unpredictable and heavily regulated by the state security investigations apparatus. However, 
the political opportunity or moment for mobilising collectively after January 2011 was 
exceptional in its release of revolutionary energy experienced in citizen mass mobilisation. 
Citizens took to the street to celebrate agency, to express dissent and to demand rights. 
Hence the importance of the trigger for mobilisation became less central. People were in a 
political frame of mind that made them more responsive to calls for mobilising and acting 
collectively than before.  
 
The role of leadership and repertoires of relations continued to play a central role in 
mobilising through collective agency and for collective action. The pre-existing repertoires of 
networks and relations between activists who worked through different cliques and groups 
during Mubarak’s era continued during the revolutionary phase, however, they reconfigured 
into new coalitions and initiatives. However, more horizontal forms of leadership with new 
repertoires of women and men also came into being after the revolution, often channelling 
their energies to new causes and issues according to the unfolding political context.  
 
There was also an observable change in how the third factor - the issue and its framing - was 
affected by the change in the political system. The importance of an issue touching on real 
life matters in order to elicit people to organise collectively continued. However, the framing 
of the issue became less tied to assuming a religious mantra and shifted towards using 
slogans, ideas and images which are part and parcel of everyday culture. This is associated 
with the change of focus (no longer geared exclusively towards policy influence) and the 
changing power dynamics (no longer a case of women’s rights’ activists versus civil and 
political society but broad based movements in some instances versus other stakeholders).  
 
On the other hand, external linkages inherent in donor support for the funding of the 
formation of collective actors or action, which often featured in many of the coalitions that 
were formed during Mubarak’s era, became far less important after the January 2011 
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revolution. People organised more organically and many of the informal youth-based 
initiatives that assumed a collective character did not have external linkages in the form of 
donor funding or support (at least in the first year after their inception).  
 
In terms of the success of collective actors, both to survive and to elicit change: (i) the 
political will of the status quo, (ii) ideological orientation, and (iii) alliances and networks, 
continued to be major influencing factors even after the January 2011 revolution. Political will 
refers to the choices made by those presiding over the state. While gender rights issues 
were often instrumentalised by the ruling regime to buttress its power during Mubarak’s 
reign, it became altogether sidelined from the government’s agenda after the revolution. 
Ideology is examined in terms of the underpinning of political visions, discourses and thinking 
that influence ideas, policies and practices associated with gender equality. The ideological 
orientation was patriarchal and when concessions were made, they were introduced in the 
spirit of the benevolent dictator (and caring First Lady). However, the ideological orientation 
after the revolution took the form of an overt backlash against women’s rights, as will be 
discussed below. 
  
Alliances continued to play a key factor in the success of collective action and had a clearly 
tangible impact on the ground. A comparison between the poorly attended, poorly framed 
event held in Tahrir Square to mark international women’s day in March 2011 with that of 
March 2012 is a case in point. In 2011, participation was reduced to the exclusive feminist 
few whose presence in Tahrir Square resembled a small booth in a market. In March 2012, 
the collective mobilisation of youth revolutionary movements, as well as a number of political 
parties, in addition to the gender activists led to an impressive march, attended by hundreds, 
with catchy, powerful slogans being shouted out by a broad based citizenry movement.1 
Alliances are also critically important for understanding the gender agenda being not only 
about the affirmation of an ideological agenda but also the practical political division of power 
between different interest groups driven by the desire to maximise gains for themselves.  
 
 
2  Aligning women’s equality with amoebic 
authoritarianism during Mubarak’s reign 
 
2.1 Broader context 
The power dynamics informing governance politics and processes were influx during the 
thirty years of Mubarak’s reign. Like the amoeba which does not have a particular shape, so 
too authoritarianism does not have a particular mode of operating, and is ever changing and 
dynamic. In the last five years of Mubarak’s reign, power configurations were exceptionally 
fluid. During Bush’s administration, the Mubarak regime was pressed to open spaces for 
political dissent and freedom of expression, which it did from 2005-2007. During this time, 
Kefaya (Enough!) a movement committed to blocking the inheritance of the presidency from 
Mubarak to his son emerged and directly challenged the highest echelons of the regime by 
organising public protests to demand a democratic rotation of power.  
 
Restrictions on the press and non-state media were relaxed to a large degree. As the toll of 
economic hardship increased, people also began to mobilise around bread and butter issues, 
the largest and most organised of which were the workers’ movements. However, during the 
latter years, levels of political repression, corruption and impoverishment were conspicuously 
felt, in particular in 2009-2010. It became increasingly clear that Gamal Mubarak was being 
                                                 
1  I am very grateful to Professor Hania Sholkamy for sharing this example with me, since she was present on both 
events in March 2011 and March 2012 
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groomed to succeed his father as president, and his entourage of select businessmen were 
becoming increasingly powerful. The parliamentary elections of 2010, which witnessed a 
high level of corruption and regulation by the state security investigations apparatus, brought 
the country closer to the brink, and with the Tunisian revolution and the heightened political 
dissidence of protestors against the bombing of a church on New Year’s Eve 2011, the 
scene was set for a major challenge to the regime (Tadros 2012).  
  
 
2.2 Gendering amoebic authoritarianism  
Against this backdrop of unpredictable opening and closing of public engagement space, 
there were various actors with contending agendas striving to influence the ‘gender agenda’ 
in Egypt. The most influential were the ruling party, the National Council for Women, a 
number of NGOs and coalitions committed to gender equality, and the Islamist movements. 
The influence varied across time (especially political moment), issue, and space (local versus 
national versus international) and the kind of coalitions through which the actors worked. 
Prior to the Egyptian revolution, the situation was characterised by a number of promising but 
also highly constraining realities. As has been established in much of the literature (for 
example Htun 2003; Jad 2010; Khattak 2010) authoritarianism is not necessarily inimical to 
women’s rights, as long as these rights do not challenge the power base of the status quo in 
fundamental ways. This has manifest itself, for example, in the practice of instating new 
revisions to legal codes, such as with respect to more draconian measures of ensuring that 
men pay alimony including threat of imprisonment. In essence it is a manifestation of 
‘governance feminism’ which Kandiyoti describes as a system which involves ‘a top down 
enforcement of women’s rights’ in a way that is underpinned by oppressive governance 
practice (Kandiyoti 2014). 
  
The challenges taken into account by autocrats are not only those posed from women 
assuming more rights but also the level of resistance which may be generated when these 
rights are opposed by important groups from within the party as well as the opposition. For 
example, Mubarak’s regime has no qualms with introducing a quota for more seats in 
parliament to accommodate 20 per cent women’s representation. However, the rules of the 
political system were set in such a way as to ensure that increased women’s representation 
served the interests of the regime (Tadros 2010a). Women affiliated to the ruling party 
occupied almost all the 64 ‘quota seats’ in parliament.  
 
Nonetheless, during Mubarak’s reign, a number of important changes in legislation regulating 
the public and private lives of women were made. Family law was reformed in order to open 
up new possibilities for women to secure a fast track to divorce through khul’,2 the age of 
marriage was increased to 18, female genital mutilation was criminalised, and rapists could 
no longer avoid punishment by offering to marry their victims. The prohibition of women from 
assuming judicial positions was challenged and the first women judges were appointed, the 
nationality decree which prohibited women from passing on their nationality to their children if 
their husbands were non-Egyptian was altered, and women no longer needed the permission 
of their husbands in order to travel. These changes were introduced in tandem with the 
liberal feminist tradition of focusing on legislative reform as a key to addressing gender 
inequalities. Issues of economic justice such as the needs of women in the rural areas, 
educated young women, and women in the informal sector were absent in these agendas. 
 
 
                                                 
2  The right of women to unilaterally divorce men through a court system by forgoing some of their financial rights 
(though not those of their children).  
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2.3 National women’s machineries 
In Egypt, the First Lady presided over the two national machineries concerning women: the 
National Council for Women (NCW), a para-state entity established in 2000, answerable to 
the Prime Minister, and the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM), 
established in 1988. These organisations were a hybrid between a QUANGO (Quasi-non-
governmental organisation) and a GONGO (government-organised non-governmental 
organisation) (Fowler 1997). Institutionally, they typify Fowler’s definition of a QUANGO, 
namely, a para-state body set up by government as an NGO, often to enable better 
conditions of service or create political distance. They enjoy the status of autonomous 
organisations and are neither considered part of the executive arm of the government nor are 
accountable to any governmental ministry. They have their own budgets, board and internal 
governance structure. However, in terms of function, the national women’s machineries 
serve as GONGOs, namely they are used to capture or redirect non-profit funds allocated by 
the official aid system. Women affiliated to the national women’s machineries tended to be 
able to directly exert influence on the policymaking process because of their proximity to the 
political will of the ruling regime. 
 
However, the NCW had a record of appropriating feminist voice without crediting the feminist 
activism that had lobbied for change for decades. For example, in the case of the nationality 
law, despite many years of lobbying by women’s NGOs and feminist activists for the change, 
when parliament discussed the ministerial decree, MPs made no mention of the role of civil 
activism in bringing it to the fore. Rather, one MP after another stood up to thank the First 
Lady for her benevolence towards Egyptian women. 
 
Authoritarian regimes often instrumentalise bestowing more rights upon women both: to 
appear as benevolent patrons who change policy in response to their recognition of the 
people’s needs; and to give the international community the image that they are committed to 
democracy. There were instances in which the NCW did collaborate with women’s NGOs 
and coalitions, however, its ability to mobilise a constituency of supporters beyond people 
close to the ruling regime was stymied. It neither had a grassroots base (i.e. among ordinary 
women and men) nor did it have the support of feminists, NGOs, coalitions and other non-
state actors. The reasons were: it was too close to the regime to be perceived as enjoying 
autonomy; its governance structures were highly elitist and exclusionary, almost to the point 
of being handpicked by the First Lady; and it appropriated feminist struggle by reaping the 
fruits of policy changes which it did not exclusively sow. Tragically, its greatest asset - having 
the regime’s ear for policy influence and political leverage via the First Lady’s leadership - 
became its greatest curse after the Egyptian revolution of 2011, a theme we will return to 
later. 
 
 
2.4 Feminist voices, NGOs and coalitions 
In Egypt, during the Mubarak era, feminist voice was expressed by a small group of women 
activists who tended to come from a professional background and engaged through NGO 
channels. The choice of NGOs as the medium through which to engage was informed by a 
number of important political dynamics: the heavy-handed security co-option and/or 
repression of political parties resulting in the need to find other platforms for engaging 
politically in covert ways; the need to have a legal identity in order to avoid the wrath of the 
security apparatus since collective action without the permit of the government was by and 
large prohibited; the increasing salience of the gender and development paradigm and the 
possibilities it opened for thinking about gender and social change.  
 
The formation of NGOs committed to gender and social justice issues as well as community 
development and advocacy was a positive redirection of feminist energies that may have 
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otherwise been quelled due to the political environment. The NGO-isation of feminist 
activism, however, also had its negative ripple effects because of its reliance on and 
competition over foreign funding. Firstly, it generated the ‘boutique phenomenon’ women 
responding to the presence of foreign funding by setting up their own income generating 
enterprises cloaked as non-profit activism and secondly, competition over scarce resources 
made it more difficult for individual leaders and entities to work together for the achievement 
of a common goal, or mobilise ranks for movement building. 
  
Towards the mid-2000s, the formation of partnerships and initiatives involving several actors 
became popular in feminist discourse and gender and development work. This contributed to 
the emergence of campaigns, networks, and coalitions though they fell short of a movement. 
This is not to suggest that they spontaneously sprouted, feminist leaders, NGO practitioners 
and activists had gained extensive experience in mobilising collectively throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s. The FGM Coalition was an example of the emergence of a collective body 
bringing together diverse actors around a common agenda: a socially sensitive approach for 
addressing female genital mutilation. For many of the actors involved, such an experience 
provided a repertoire of contacts, and organisational experience in participatory forms of 
decision-making and consensus-building processes. Other successful experiences included 
the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women) 
Coalition, which though it went through spurts of activism and dormancy, was able to create 
a platform of influence and successful mobilisation (Tadros 2010b). 
  
In terms of strategies of engagement and agenda-setting, the nature of civil society activism 
around gender equality in Mubarak’s latter years had a number of general characteristics:  
 
 Feminist inspired forms of activism had, during Mubarak’s era, accumulated 
extensive experience in policy engagement but were very thin on building or 
sustaining a constituency, a corps or group of supporters on whose behalf they could 
make claims of representation. Many activists and organisations were active in 
launching advocacy campaigns to challenge gender-discriminatory practices such as 
sexual harassment, domestic violence and a discriminatory nationality law. While they 
lacked a significant constituency to champion their causes, they were often 
successful in ensuring that their voices were present in the media and succeeded in 
highlighting issues for debate amongst the public. 
 
 Feminist voice in the contemporary Egyptian context has generally focused on 
campaigning for strategic gender interests, ‘those involving claims to transform social 
relations in order to enhance women’s position and to secure a more lasting 
repositioning of women within the gender order and within society at large’ (Molyneux 
2003: 153). Examples include feminist critiques of gender stereotypes in education 
and the media. However, in practice, women workers and civil servants have 
organised around practical gender interests, ‘those based on the satisfaction of needs 
arising from women’s placement within the sexual division of labour’ (2003: 153). 
Rowbotham argues that there is a need to recognise that engaging with women’s 
autonomy and gender relations cannot be abstracted from material circumstances 
(1992: 306). This reflects the dilemma facing feminists voicing a feminist agenda: 
intellectually, they are engaged with gender in relation to practical issues, however, in 
practice, the necessary links with a constituency that can lead on the advocacy 
campaigns and research work are absent. This disconnect between feminist activists 
and the wider female constituency is partly due to: limitations on freedom of 
association (though not after the demise of Mubarak), inexperience in engaging 
grassroots communities, and the elitist background of some of the activists.  
 
 Within feminist inspired organisations, divisions have been around some ideological 
rifts but also clique groupings. Ideological rifts emerged between secular feminists 
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who refused to adopt a religious framework and women activists working through 
NGOs who increasingly embraced a more conciliatory approach towards integrating 
‘progressive’ religious discourses in their work. The cliques relate to individuals 
coalescing into groups based on political orientations (Nasserite, liberal, leftist) and 
personality clashes. These demarcations are fluid, however, they have often had 
bearings on the ability of different groups to work together to build a united front with 
a singular voice in relation to the government, the internal opposition or transnational 
spaces. While diversity is desirable, competing leaderships, different banners for 
organising and internal disputes undermine the prospects of leveraging the power of 
the collective when it is needed.  
 
As one feminist, Dr Magda Adly of El Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and Torture astutely pointed out, it was easier for various actors committed to 
gender equality to work together for a short period of time on a specific issue through, for 
example, a campaign that was time-bound than it was to work in a sustained manner 
towards movement-building that is internally cohesive and bound together by an overarching 
common cause. Nevertheless, activists committed to gender equality were able to work 
together through various networks and coalitions. Successful coalitions such as the FGM 
Coalition in the 1990s and the CEDAW Coalition, which is over ten years old, provided 
participants with an opportunity to build repertoires among themselves. 
 
Repertoires comprise relations and collaborations built across different individuals and 
groups through experience in working together on campaigns and coalitional work. It is worth 
noting for example, that following the Egyptian revolution, new coalitions that emerged such 
as the Revolutionary Women’s Coalition included many members that had worked together 
under the Network of Women’s Rights Organisations and the CEDAW coalition. Hence, while 
fragmented, these expressions of collective action were important in generating repertoires 
that enabled individuals and groups to be responsive to political opportunity and necessity 
and coalesce around common causes and pursue collective action. As will be shown below, 
the collective front forged after the 25 January revolution was too weak to enable women’s 
rights supporters to leverage any influence on the interim government or authorities in power. 
However, the intensity of the backlash against women’s rights eventually allowed them to 
mobilise with greater collective strength against the Morsi regime.  
 
 
2.5 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Muslim Sisters 
Islamist movements have been some of the most important actors who have mobilised 
around gender issues, and the Muslim Brotherhood has been by far the most central actor 
from within these movements. Muslim Brotherhood mobilisation during Mubarak’s rule 
occurred at many levels: internationally at conferences against for example the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) document and CEDAW, nationally 
through parliament against proposed legislation, and sometimes locally by pressing for the 
rights of women wearing the face veil on university campuses.  
 
 The competition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government (as well as 
the ruling National Democratic Party) to show who is more committed to Islam added another 
layer of complexity to interpreting the increasing Islamisation of public life in Egypt during the 
past three decades 
 
During Mubarak’s reign, women belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood had an inverse 
relationship to the ruling regime on gender issues through feminist forms of activism. They 
had a low profile at the policy level but were extremely active at the grassroots level via the 
various Islamist networks of welfare provision and religious education. In one sense, the 
Muslim Sisters have remained true to the vision of Hassan el Banna, founder of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, that they would play an important role in da’wa (proselytisation). Shortly 
following Hassan el Banna's establishment of the first branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Ismailiya in 1928, he established a club, a mosque, and a school for boys followed by a 
school for girls named ‘Umahat al Mo'meneen’ (the mothers of believers). The school was 
purposed with teaching the wives, daughters and female relatives of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, combining Islamic teaching with subjects that are seen to be pertinent to 
women's domestic role (Khayal and El Gohary 1993: 231-2 cited in Tadros 2012). Hassan el 
Banna envisioned a role for the Muslim Sisters that would extend beyond the classroom and 
encompass da‘wa among women in the households of Muslim Brotherhood members and 
society more widely. 
  
In 1944, a new structure was instituted for the management of the Muslim Sisters, which 
blocked any possibility of women assuming leadership positions. The leader of the division 
would be a man, so too his deputy and one woman would serve as the liaison between the 
leader and the women members. Unlike other divisions which had rank and file, the Muslim 
Sisters did not in that organisational structure have committees, taskforces, or any other 
organisational mechanism for delegating responsibilities and authorities. In interviews with 
the Muslim Sisters in the mid-2000s, they explained that an autonomous Muslim Sisterhood 
was unnecessary because there is one singular leadership, that of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which is all-encompassing for all members, be it women or men. They also pointed out that 
the lack of visibility of the Muslim Sisters in the formal leadership structures within the Muslim 
Brotherhood (such as the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council) was a tactical measure 
to protect the women from the wrath of the security apparatus (in view of the frequent 
governmental crackdowns on leaders in the movement). 
 
However, the Muslim Sisters have been very active in international spaces mobilising 
through transnational advocacy. Many members of the Muslim Sisters hold leadership 
positions in the International Islamic Committee for Woman and Child (IIC) as one of the 
committees of the International Islamic Council for Da‘wa and Relief3 headed by the Grand 
Imam Sheikh of Al-Azhar, one of Sunni Islam’s most renowned institutions of Islamic learning 
globally.4 Through the IIC, the Muslim Sisters have been active on two fronts: lobbying at 
international events to present the Muslim perspective on proposed agendas, and 
campaigning against the use of international women’s treaties as the basis for reforming 
national family legislation in Egypt and other Muslim majority countries. 
 
During Mubarak’s term in Egypt, protests, marches and other forms of mobilisation by the 
Muslim Sisters has been rare (see Tadros 2013 for further information). By far the largest 
forms of organised public protest initiated by women during this time have been initiated by 
women workers. Women workers mobilised around livelihood issues such as poor wages 
and delays or cancellations in bonuses and fringe benefits (that have become a substitute for 
raising salaries). These women did not organise through formal trade unions which tend to 
be government-controlled and often take a position against workers’ rights. Neither have they 
organised as women, but instead as fellow workers and employees.  
 
Women’s mobilisation took place at particular localities: for instance, a particular factory at 
risk of shedding labour as a consequence of privatisation, or a public-owned enterprise 
failing to give workers their wages for months on end. In response to the increasing 
deprivation and fall in the standard of living, women were among the central actors who 
organised protests, sit-ins and appeals for their rights. They have assumed leadership 
positions, earned through the support of both men and women, to speak out against 
injustices and negotiate with the ruling powers over the terms of any compromises reached. 
                                                 
3  The Council comprises 85 Islamic organisations from around the world.  
4  For more information on the ICC, visit their website on http://iicwc.org/lagna/iicwc/iicwc.php?id=476 
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In doing so, they have broken many social taboos regarding the appropriate spaces for 
women to occupy as well as socially prescribed curfews on when to be at home, by, for 
example, sleeping in tents on the streets and sleeping in factories during sit-ins. 
  
 
3  The 25 January revolution: From Mubarak 
to El Mosheer (Field Marshall Tantawy) 
 
3.1 Broader context  
After 18 days of sustained mass protest, President Mubarak was ousted and the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), representing the army, took over the country. The move 
was initially welcomed by the political actors who had mobilised for the removal of Mubarak, 
as an interim measure until a new constitution, parliamentary and presidential elections could 
be held. The period in which the SCAF ruled was a highly turbulent one in which the country 
faced new and accumulated political, economic and social threats. 
  
Politically, an entente was forged between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood (Tadros 
2012). In return for SCAF creating an enabling environment for the Muslim Brotherhood to 
ascend to political power, the latter would ensure political acquiescence to SCAF’s 
leadership and counter any resistance. In effect, the Brotherhood would control the crowds to 
minimise dissent. The exclusion of key stakeholders from the political entente, such as the 
youth revolutionary forces and other political parties, generated deep hostility, which then 
escalated into political violence.  
 
This phase was also characterised by the relaxation of the shackles of the security 
apparatus’ regulation of every aspect of public life, and against the backdrop of the downfall 
of a thirty year old regime, there was a sense of political fluidity that is characteristic of 
revolutionary phases where political forces seek to secure a piece of the new pie that is 
being divided. Salafis who had adopted a stance of non-engagement in political affairs during 
Mubarak’s era flourished after the revolution. Some groups from within the Salafi movement 
chose to enter the political arena, while others chose not to, but sought to increase their 
da’wa activities. The cumulative impact of the burgeoning of several different Islamist groups 
was felt on the ground well before they assumed formal powers through parliament or the 
presidency.  
 
3.2 Ejecting women from the picture 
The Egyptian Revolution, instigated on 25 January 2011 saw the participation and leadership 
of women in a bid to oust Mubarak from power and demand ‘freedom, justice and dignity’ for 
all. At the beginning many of the women revolutionaries were clearly taking a gender-blind 
approach, delegating gender issues to ‘later’ or they refused to acknowledge them at all. 
There were exceptions but few chose to speak out. When a number of women were exposed 
to virginity tests on 8 March 2011, the initial reaction of one part of the feminist movement 
was to deny it so as not to besmirch the image of the army. It is only thanks to the insistence 
of others that the issue was brought to the fore, and Amnesty International then responded to 
local protestations by exposing it internationally.  
 
Many feminists, human rights activists and revolutionaries had raised expectations that 
women’s agency would be recognised by the post-Mubarak state and society alike, through 
increased opportunities for leadership and more egalitarian attitudes towards citizenship 
rights for all, irrespective of gender.   
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The assumption was that the conspicuous role and activism of women in the revolution 
would be rewarded with recognition. Yet this did not happen. As with countries that have 
experienced regime changes, the link between participation and representation and 
recognition has rarely been an automatic one. This became very evident in the disjuncture 
between the size and scope of women’s participation in the revolution compared to their 
representation within policy spaces later on. Not a single woman was included on the first 
committee delegated with the amendment of part of the constitution prior to the constitutional 
referendum of March 2011, despite the country having a large number of women 
constitutional experts, including Tahany el Gabaly, who at the time served as the Deputy 
Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court. In the first Constituent Assembly designated with 
developing Egypt’s first post-revolutionary constitution, there were only six women out of one 
hundred members (in April 2012 the assembly was declared unconstitutional and dissolved 
due to technical irregularities in the application of the electoral law). There was a significant 
drop in women’s parliamentary representation from 13 per cent in 2010 to 2 per cent in 2011 
even though the number of women campaigning for office had doubled.  
 
The reasons for excluding women from the centres of power were both ideological and 
political. Ideologically, both the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood held deeply patriarchal 
values regarding leadership, defined in masculine terms. Further, there was an ideological 
commitment on the part of many Islamists to emphasise conservative gender roles as part 
and parcel of a broader political project to amplify Egypt’s Islamic identity. Politically, the 
youth revolutionary movements that had instigated the uprising against Mubarak in the first 
place found themselves sidelined. A narrative of the hijack of the Egyptian revolution by 
SCAF and the Muslim Brothers began to be heard only a month after the ousting of Mubarak. 
Additionally, under the rubric of bringing down all that was associated with the Mubarak 
regime, there emerged in March 2011 a united front between the youth revolutionaries and 
the Islamists and others against policies that were associated with Suzanne Mubarak. For 
example, while there were deep disagreements over the electoral law, there was consensus 
that the quota for women should go. Opponents saw it as a tool deployed by the former 
regime to increase its dominance, spearheaded by the First Lady.  
 
Another important political factor that directly contributed to a disconnect between women’s 
activism and their representation was the competition over who should represent the post-
Mubarak agenda for women’s rights, and what its content should be. Some of this rivalry had 
its roots in personality clashes and membership in contending groups during Mubarak’s era. 
The competition was between a number of leading feminists who have had strong 
associations with civil society in various roles. These divisions were over leadership and 
partly agenda and manifested themselves in the negotiations over what to do with the 
National Council for Women. There were those who preferred its complete demise and the 
birth of a new institution that did not have as much negative baggage. Some preferred 
leadership change while keeping the structure intact. Others opted for a complete overhaul of 
the structure of the institution, but fell short of calling for its liquidation.  
 
Feminist scholarship suggests that the nature of women’s collective action prior to regime 
change plays an important role in influencing the extent to which the processes and 
outcomes recognise gender equality (Waylen 1994; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Zulu 2000). 
Viterna and Fallon’s study of four countries that have experienced regime change (South 
Africa, Argentina, Ghana and El Salvador) indicates that among the key factors that account 
for a positive outcome for integrating gender equality in new political orders are a cohesive 
coalition within the women’s movement and a legacy of women’s activism that legitimates 
present-day feminist demands (2008: 669; Tadros 2013).  
 
Regrettably, this cohesion was missing at the time of the 2011 January revolution. A number 
of women’s coalitions had formed after the revolution such as the Women Revolutionary 
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Coalition which essentially comprised of NGOs who had organised under different banners 
during Mubarak’s era (membership was a mixture of members from the Egyptian Network for 
Women’s Rights and the CEDAW Coalition). While the new coalition was effective in issuing 
policy statements (on the overall political situation and women’s demands) and press 
releases (condemning women’s rights violations), its representational power vis-à-vis 
women’s collective actions was by and large limited.  
 
The Egyptian Feminist Union, formed in 2011 to revive Hoda Sharawi’s original organisation, 
sought to provide an umbrella for building consensus around a common set of demands for 
women post-revolution. The document which became known as the ‘Women’s Charter’ had 
the endorsement of hundreds of thousands of signatures. However, the Union’s mobilisation 
of support was vertical (smaller organisations in the governorates), it had limited horizontal 
support (from the other women’s coalitions working in the policy arena). Hence, its delegation 
power was also quite limited.  
 
The failure to act through a cohesive unified front had an impact on weakening the legitimacy 
of the women’s coalitions’ demands, first because there was no consensus on the demands, 
and second, because their fragmented nature undermined their political clout.  
  
This is in stark contrast to the Muslim Sisters whose unified ranks enabled them to present 
counter-coalitions of influence on women’s rights. Following the Egyptian revolution, the 
Muslim Sisters were able to seize the newly opened political spaces to engage fully in the 
social, political and economic life of the nation. They had extensive and expansive skills in 
outreach and constituency building established through years of welfare provision through 
charitable organisations and through building bridges with women in universities and 
educational institutes. In 2011, against the backdrop of a new political climate allowing them 
to engage in formal political spaces, the Muslim Sisters played an instrumental role in 
transforming the social base into a political constituency. For example, each year on 
Mother’s Day, every Egyptian province celebrates a woman deemed to be a “model mother”. 
Nehad Abou el Qomsan director of the Centre for Egyptian Women’s Rights, a non-
governmental association, noted that in her governorate, Giza, women activists from the 
Freedom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm) paid a visit to this model 
mother, gave her a Quran, and invited her to become a member of the party.5 
 
However, the disjuncture between their newly emancipated roles as citizens and their 
internal position within the Muslim Brotherhood persisted, and became more conspicuous 
after the Egyptian revolution. The invisibility of the Muslim Sisters within the formal decision-
making apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood has reflected a lack of true recognition of their 
status, and contribution. Contrary to some scholars’ expectations that once the shackles of 
Mubarak’s authoritarian rule were removed, the Muslim Sisters would gain their rightful place 
within the Muslim Brothers’ internal hierarchy, this did not materialise. There are no women 
members in the Shura Council of the Muslim Brotherhood and no women members in the 
Guidance Bureau. Some young women members, who felt empowered by the experience of 
participating in the Egyptian revolution and realised afterwards that there were few 
opportunities of influence within the Brotherhood, felt compelled to leave. While the 
Brotherhood’s power centres remained impenetrable for women, there were more spaces for 
their participation and assumption of formal leadership roles in the Freedom and Justice 
Party – as founders and as members on several committees.  
 
The Muslim Sisters played a central role in the success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
ascendency to political power through the parliamentary elections of 2011/2012. As the 
electoral law did not specify where women should be placed on the party list, it is not 
surprising that the Muslim Sisters hardly featured at the top of the lists although this was the 
                                                 
5  Interview with Nehad Abou el Komsan, Cairo, March 2012. 
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same with most of the other political parties, including some of the non-Islamist parties that 
pride themselves on a commitment to gender equality. However, some of the Muslim Sisters 
did manage to win a seat in parliament. In line with the profile of the Muslim Sisters’ in 
leadership positions, they were all highly educated, occupying white collar professional 
positions, middle-aged or older, and with decades’ experience in social work. One common 
characteristic in their profiles is that one way or another, they were connected to the work of 
the IIC and they championed its agenda in their new role as parliamentarians. Members of 
the Muslim Sisters advocated the decriminalising of female genital mutilation, the removal of 
women’s arbitrary right to divorce through khul’ and the reduction of the minimum age of 
marriage. The suspicions held by many non-Islamist feminists that the Muslim Sisters would 
seek to revoke the modicum of rights that were secured through women’s century long 
mobilisation for emancipation proved to be well-founded.  
 
Beyond the policy-level, the situation with respect to women’s rights on the ground was a 
complex one. In focus groups undertaken in May 2012, when women and men were asked to 
comment on the impact of the revolution on their lives, one of the most positive factors 
making the top of the list was their sense of freedom. One woman commented that before 
the revolution, she was interested in politics but every time she talked openly people used to 
silence her or she would end up being arrested by the state security investigations 
apparatus. After the revolution, she pointed out, she is able to talk openly about politics with 
whomever she wished - even loudly in the market - without fearing that an informant would 
be at her heel. Another important change reported in the focus groups with the young women 
in particular, was a sense of claimed voice. This was expressed in different ways: that they 
now had opinions to make about issues and that they engaged in debates with their families 
and friends about the events in the country. This sense of empowerment through voice also 
manifested itself in the conversations about exercising choice: choosing their president and 
expressing what they want and what they oppose. 
 
Almost all the women in the focus groups said they had voted in the parliamentary elections, 
fewer said they had voted in the first round of the presidential elections. Most participants 
were very proud to point out that it was their first time ever to vote. One working woman 
made a point about how the new political climate encouraged her to engage in formal politics 
in ways that she had not done before. She pointed out that after the revolution of January 
2011, for the first time ever she voted in her syndicate and participated in the parliamentary 
and presidential elections. However, this high level of political participation should not be 
equated with more rights. Decisions affecting rural non-working women’s choices seemed 
highly dubious. When asked how they chose their candidate, many said that they chose 
according to what everyone else was choosing, or that they would go to the voting polling 
station and wait until someone told them who to pick! It was unclear whether they were 
promised any reward for their voting by the person at the voting station, however, others, for 
example in Minya spoke about how, during the parliamentary elections, the Sunniyeen (a 
broad term referring to the Islamists) distributed food (including fave beans, lentils, and 
honey) and money and told them to vote for the Freedom and Justice Party. In some cases, 
people knew the signs they voted for (al mizan, computer, etc) but did not know the name of 
the candidate!  
 
Since the 25 January revolution the two greatest issues that women have consistently 
complained about as life changing are security laxity and a decline in the economy. Women 
fear for their personal safety and that of their family members due to the unchecked violence 
of thugs, organised gangs, thieves, and other actors. People perceive the thugs as being 
responsible for the increased incidence of muggings, harassments and violent assaults after 
the revolution. Many of the focus group members had personal stories to recount on their 
exposure (or that of members of their family) to theft and/or increased sexual harassment.  
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While the increased lack of personal safety was identified as threatening to all people - 
women, children and men- there were clear gendered dimensions to it. First, in reaction to 
this state of fear, families often imposed new restrictions on girls' and women's mobility but 
found it more difficult to do the same for male youth. Second, many women argued that while 
they could try to limit their own mobility, this was impossible for their husbands whose 
livelihoods required them to work in the late hours of the night or commute long distances. 
Third, as everyone imposed new cautionary measures in response to the perceived 
insecurity, this caused severe burdens on women's time. They now had to undertake 
additional chores such as taking their children to school and bringing them back (prior to the 
revolution they would let them go with their friends if they lived nearby), as well as - in cases 
when their children were taking tutorials in the evening - wait for several hours until they had 
finished in order to take them home.  
 
In all the focus groups, participants highlighted the increased prevalence of sexual 
harassment. Many pointed out that sexual harassment was manifest in the streets well 
before the revolution and had been part of people’s daily lived experiences, however, it had 
increased in both intensity and frequency. For example, in terms of the degree of sexual 
harassment, some suggest that there is greater boldness on the part of those who harass on 
the street, in terms of resorting to physical contact. While all women shared a sense of 
increased vulnerability to harassment, Christian women said they were not only harassed on 
account of being women but also on account of their religion. This became particularly 
manifest in the kind of slurs that accompanied the harassment, for example referring to them 
as ‘blue boned’.6 
 
The overall security situation was astutely summarised by one young person in Alexandria 
who noted that while the Egyptian people had broken the fear barrier through the revolution 
yet they were now too scared to be on their own streets.  
 
Economically, the collapse of tourism, the closure of factories and businesses, the 
withdrawal of investment, the security situation and other macro-crises have taken their toll 
on Egyptian women and their families. There is increased unemployment and 
underemployment and in some instances a drop in salaries. In other instances, there has 
been a marginal increase in public servants’ salaries but it has been far less than the 
increase in the rate of inflation. Increases in food and basic commodities prices has led to a 
drop in living standards and depleted women’s survival strategies, i.e. having to sell assets 
such as personal jewellery and borrow in order to make ends meet. The association between 
the decline in economic wellbeing and the revolution was so intense in some focus groups 
that people said they wished to go back to the days of Mubarak. NGO workers who facilitated 
the focus groups said they were struck by the extent to which not only the poor but also the 
middle class had been negatively affected by the economic downfall. This was manifest in 
the way they talked openly about depriving their families of food and clothing, selling their 
gold and borrowing. Socially, it would have been seen as undignified for middle-class women 
to admit to this, since it was the poor who resorted to such strategies.  
 
In many focus groups, women told of their exposure to a post-revolution talk that was 
increasingly antagonistic towards women. People in the street said that Mubarak’s downfall 
was due to his wife’s interference in the running of the country. The narrative may have 
varied, but many men said gloatingly that now that Mubarak is out, ‘Suzanne’s laws’ will be 
revoked. It was not only the laws that they were referring to, but the whole notion of 
promoting women’s equality, which they saw as imposed from above.  
 
                                                 
6  One of the slurs used against Copts, associated with practices originating in the Abbasiyyid period during which they 
wore heavy crosses, leading to the emergence of bluish-purple patches on the backbone in the neck area.  
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There was much confusion over what the rise of the Islamists meant in terms of women’s 
situation. Three issues were at the centre of the debate: women’s attire, education and work. 
On women’s attire, the prevailing perception was that the Salafis would push for women to 
wear the niqab, while the Muslim Brotherhood would press for all to veil, but not necessarily 
don the face veil. In most focus groups, this was based on perception. In two focus groups, 
women spoke of being subjected to intense pressure to veil on the streets. On the question 
of education, there was again the perception that the Salafis would urge that girls stay at 
home and discourage them from pursuing education beyond the basics. This was met with 
strong resistance from participants who said that their girls’ education was non-negotiable.  
 
On perceptions of the Islamists’ views on women’s work, there was more confusion and 
controversy. While some argued that both the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood will 
discourage women’s work, some said only the former will. Some argued that even if they 
want to, they would not be able to enforce a prohibition on women’s work because they 
would not be able to compensate women’s earnings. Others argued that if the Islamists were 
to secure a living for women at home, this would be far better for women who would no 
longer have to be exposed to so much hardship. Others argued that even if the Islamists 
were able to pay them their salaries in full, they would still resist staying at home because 
they do not only work to earn a living. One member of the Salafi movement said that if 
women were to stay at home, the overcrowding, noise and transport problems would all be 
solved. 
 
 
 
4  From El Mosheer [Tantawy] to Morsi 
 
4.1 Broader context 
The political ascendency of President Morsi to power was met with celebration by the 
Islamist factions and with cautious optimism on the part of many belonging to various non-
Islamist social and political forces, and strong opposition among others. Prior to Morsi 
coming to power, an informal entente was established between a number of leading non-
Islamist political forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, known as the Fairmont Agreement. The 
Agreement spelt out that in return for the revolutionary forces, political parties and some 
leading intellectuals’ endorsement of Morsi’s candidacy against Ahmed Shafik, the Brothers 
would commit to power sharing, should they come to office. While some political and social 
forces remained stout opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power, there was a 
great deal of pressure on the new regime to deliver on many of its ambitious political, 
economic and social policies, particularly those set out in the 100 day programme of action 
which was primarily focused on reinstating security for citizens, cleaning up the cities and 
improving the economic situation.  
 
  
4.2 The gender agenda with the new conditionalities 
All eyes were looking to the new Muslim Brotherhood regime to show that its agenda was 
commensurate with human rights on two principle fronts: gender equality and the rights of 
religious minorities, the largest of which were the Copts who comprise roughly ten per cent of 
the population. In other words, of all the proxies for democratic governance, the Brothers 
were under particular pressure to show that women’s rights would be respected, and if they 
were not enhanced, then at least they would not experience a regression. The two principle 
foci around which gender issues were prioritised at the beginning of Morsi’s reign were: (i) 
the constitution and, (ii) an end to the ever-widening phenomenon of gender-based violence 
 21 
 
in public spaces. These were the two gender issues which generated the most mobilisation 
and which merit some reflection here and which had lingered on from SCAF’s rule. 
  
The first issue, the constitution, was of critical importance to the predicament of women’s 
rights and entitlements. One of the conditions agreed to in the Fairmont Agreement was that 
if they come to power, the Muslim Brotherhood would endorse a constitution whose 
composition was premised on inclusive representation of all the different political forces 
rather than predominantly the party in power, and whose decisions were arrived at through a 
consensus making process rather than majoritarian vote. After Morsi came to power, the 
different political forces arrived at an agreement whereby the Islamists would take 50 per 
cent of the 100 seat Constituent Assembly and the non-Islamist political forces the other 50 
per cent. This seemed on the surface as a compromise for all. Ghozlan, a member of the 
Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood and the media spokesperson for the movement 
argued that since the Islamists occupied 77 per cent of the seats in parliament, they had 
already given way by having a lower percentage of the Constituent Assembly. The non-
Islamists argued that they had sacrificed the notion of a rainbow representation, whereby 
equal weight is given to all different political forces, rather than this polarised framework. 
Another agreement that they had reached was that both sides would need to approve of the 
persons proposed by the other. Since the majority in parliament were Islamists, they 
effectively had more power to veto candidates they were wary of than the non-Islamist 
political forces had.  
 
The representation of women in the Constituent Assembly was problematic on two fronts: 
descriptive and substantive. From a descriptive point of view, there were seven women in the 
Constituent Assembly, representing only 7 per cent of the total membership. From a 
substantive point of view, i.e. in terms of advancing women’s interests, the situation was 
significantly worse. Other than Manal el Teeby, none of the women members had a record of 
championing women’s rights. The position of the women representatives from the Muslim 
Brotherhood was to espouse the agenda that they had championed and lobbied in national 
and international fora for years: a rejection of any articles that challenge men’s qawama7 and 
that remotely relate to the rights enshrined in CEDAW. However, the Muslim Sisters also 
pointed to the introduction of a new clause recognising the state’s commitment to providing 
support for female-headed households and the neediest as an indicator of the new regime’s 
commitment to women’s rights. In fact, the new parliament had already issued a law in May 
2012 recognising female-headed households’ rights to medical benefits.8  
 
Undoubtedly the recognition of the welfare needs of vulnerable women is a positive addition, 
however its acceptance by the Muslim Sisters lies in the fact that it does not challenge power 
relations between men and women and in effect, its wording reeks of a paternalistic state 
engaging with the vulnerable through a needs-based rather than rights-based framework.  
 
Various (non-Islamist) actors all concurred with the Muslim Sisters’ championing of the 
insertion of a conditionality on women’s rights within the constitution, and were the most 
vehement opponents of the insertion of any article that would expand women’s rights in 
relation to bodily integrity. They opposed the introduction of an article setting a minimum age 
of marriage for women as well as any constitutional clause that would condemn all forms of 
violence against women, arguing that both could be potentially tackled through legislation 
and did not have to be mentioned in the constitution. On other articles such as on human and 
sex trafficking, the Islamist lobby by and large, denied their prevalence in Egyptian society. 
This refusal to acknowledge such social phenomena was extremely perplexing since the 
                                                 
7  The meaning of qawama is hotly debated in Islamic jurisprudence and has been the topic of diverse interpretations. 
Among the many meanings of the word are: protection, authority, leadership.  
8  For further details on the law that was promulgated in parliament, see 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30028 
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Brothers have strong grassroots links and are deeply embedded in the everyday lives of 
Egyptians across all classes, in particular the poor. They would have seen first-hand the way 
in which multiple forms of oppression, including those of gender, work against their followers 
and beneficiaries.  
 
At the heart of the Constitutional Assembly’s dispute over women’s rights was an addendum 
to the article that recognised women’s rights. The proposed new article made such rights 
conditional upon their conformity to the Sharia. The Islamist lobby, in particular the Muslim 
Sisters, assured sceptics that the insertion of this qualifier was simply to acknowledge that in 
matters such as inheritance and divorce, equality between men and women is not absolute. 
However, many interpreted this qualifier as intended to deny women all kinds of rights, 
including those associated with leadership, under the pretext that women cannot rule over 
men. 
  
In effect the level of mistrust towards the Islamists and especially the Salafis was so deep 
that their opponents assumed a backstopping role with respect to women’s rights. They 
wanted to have enshrined in the constitution as many rights as possible for women in order 
to make it more difficult to revoke them later, and to eliminate as many loopholes (such as 
the Sharia qualifier) as possible in order to prevent a legal backlash against women’s rights.   
 
Feminist voices, though marginal, were seeking to build alliances from among the non-
Islamist forces to remove the qualifier to women’s rights and were successful. Rather than 
just removing the qualifier however, the Constituent Assembly removed the article altogether 
so as to appease the opponents as well as the Salafis. However, if feminists had won the 
battle with the qualifier, they had lost the war. They were outmanoeuvred by a last minute 
insertion of a clause that effectively empowered the Islamist constituency to redress all 
existing rights by introducing new qualifiers affiliated to Islamic jurisprudence. Article 219 was 
purposely kept at the tail of the constitution in order to deflect attention from it, it stated: ‘The 
principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of 
jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger 
community’. It was proposed by the Salafis, and supported by various Islamist movements 
and it was vehemently opposed by many representatives in the Constituent Assembly who 
had thought that there was agreement to drop it. Yet on the very last night, there was a 
majority vote by the Islamists in its favour, and it was passed.  
 
In effect, it meant that should conservative Islamist political parties assume a dominant 
presence in parliament (which they did) they could choose the most regressive 
interpretations in Islamic jurisprudence and base legislation upon them. In view of the fact 
that Al-Azhar has adopted a consistently reactionary stance on women’s rights, such 
legislation would get its blessing.  
 
The constitution fell short of fulfilling the aspirations of women activists who wanted to see an 
expansion of women’s rights as part of a broader post-Mubarak emancipatory agenda for the 
Egyptian people. Yet not only did it fail that litmus test, but when it came to women’s rights, it 
effectively represented a regression from the modicum of rights that they had been inscribed 
under the previous constitution of 1971 (even if those rights were not always implemented). 
This sentiment exceeded disappointment and spilt into feelings of being cheated and was 
sufficiently strong to catalyse women activists from different backgrounds: development 
NGOs, feminist NGOs, political parties and non-politicised citizens to join ranks at critical 
instances to make a unified stance demanding their rights.  
 
One of the most powerful of such instances was on International Women’s Day on 8 March 
2012 when women activists created strong alliances with youth revolutionary parties and 
non-Islamist political parties joining ranks to lead a march calling upon the regime to 
remember women’s rights. The numbers excelled any other march that women’s 
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organisations had ever organised on International Women’s Day in Egypt, with the 
participation of multiple constituencies and groups. It is to be contrasted for example, with the 
march that women activists had organised the previous year, which had not benefited from 
this kind of unifying of women’s advocates ranks or from alliance building with other political 
and social actors.  
 
Other than the Egyptian constitution, the other main issue that elicited large scale collective 
mobilisation was on gender-based violence in public spaces, which took two forms: 
individual/collective acts of socially-motivated sexual harassment and politically motivated 
acts of sexual assault.  
 
President Morsi had promised that in his first 100 days in office, his government would strive 
to improve security for citizens, create economic opportunities, and address the waste 
disposal problem. There did not seem to be an improvement on the streets with respect to 
exposure to daily incidents of socially motivated harassment. Politically motivated sexual 
harassment, according to Farah Shash, a psychologist with El Nadim Centre for the 
Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, had got worse. While she conceded that incidents of 
politically motivated sexual assault were documented during the rule of the SCAF, such 
incidents increased in frequency and severity when the Muslim Brotherhood took over.  
 
The reasons why some forms of sexual assault are believed to be politically motivated is 
because: (i) they happen in squares and public spaces associated with protests; (ii) they take 
place in these spaces during times when protests and demonstrations are held; (iii) the 
assaulted are disproportionately activists, whether women or men (notwithstanding the 
assault on non-politically active citizens as well); (iv) sexual violence is used in conjunction 
with other forms of violence; (v) sexual violence is not enacted on a one-to-one basis but 
through a group of men, simultaneously assaulting the woman; and (vi) the sexual assault 
does not happen in a passing moment, but is sustained over a period of time. A counter 
argument would be that similar incidents of sexual assault also occur in crowded spaces 
such as at moulids,9 major football games and even concerts. While there are many 
similarities, there are differences as well. These differences lie in the disproportionate 
targeting of women activists and in the level of brutal violence used to incur harm on the 
victim (i.e. rape through sharp objects) and in the targeting of protest spaces in the same 
spots (for example in the case of Tahrir Square, the area around Hardees was renowned to 
be a site of repeated assaults) which gives the impression that these are pre-orchestrated 
and calculated. 
  
While some initiatives such as Harassmap were established before the Egyptian revolution, 
the growing epidemic of socially and politically motivated sexual assault gave birth to new 
initiatives that sought to counter it, many of the initiatives emerging in the period between 
June-December 2012. The emerging initiatives were led by youth people, informal, organic 
and responsive to the pressing phenomenon on the ground. The informality of the activists 
leading on these initiatives can be distinguished from the institutionalised social actors that 
were registered as NGOs and civil companies. This came from their freedom and fluidity but 
it also made access to foreign funding prohibitive. The activists’ organic nature was 
exceptional in that while some did come from a professional background, others didn’t. What 
brought them together was a common struggle to make streets and squares safe for women. 
Their responsiveness was not only meaningful in terms of the rapidity of their organisation 
and mobilisation, but the kind of responsiveness they displayed. These initiatives were the 
offspring of the revolution and a political culture at the heart of which was sustained activism 
through the streets in conjunction with social and virtual media. There are many important 
lessons to be learnt here for policymakers, researchers, international donors and 
                                                 
9  Festivities in celebration of the birth of the Prophet Mohamed. 
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development practitioners about alternative discourses on gender justice, alternative 
strategies of influence and outreach and different ways of sustaining collective action.  
  
Most of these informal youth-based initiatives working on gender-based violence in public 
spaces sought to put pressure on the Morsi government from below by exposing the scale 
and intensity of women’s exposure to assault, and by holding them to account for the failure 
to protect. While there was a singular commitment to defending women’s rights to 
unhindered access to the streets on the part of these initiatives, their proponents held 
differing positions on how to engage the Morsi regime. Some adopted a position of non-
entanglement in the power struggle between Morsi and his opponents, preferring to focus 
exclusively on addressing gender-based violence. Others believed that the struggle to 
address gender-based violence was part of the broader struggle to resist the regime in place 
whose legitimacy was called into question. 
  
The Morsi regime’s stance on gender-based violence in general and harassment in particular 
only served to add fuel to the fire. At the 57th session of the CSW in March 2013, the 
commission issued a set of ‘agreed conclusions’ on the elimination of all forms of violence 
against women and girls which reiterated many of the principles highlighted in CEDAW and 
reinforced the message regarding a zero tolerance policy towards both private and public 
forms of gender-based violence. This was a golden opportunity for the Morsi-led government 
to show the international community that an Islamist regime recognises and endorses 
women’s bodily integrity. Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement condemning 
the Agreed Conclusions on account of their incompatibility with the specificity of the needs of 
Muslim women and their destruction of family values. This was the same stance that 
Pakinam el Sharkawy, the Presidential advisor took to the CSW. In her speech Pakinam also 
used the ‘cultural specificity’ argument, stating that violence against women should be 
combatted based on a ‘balance between the values shared by humanity, and the cultural and 
social particularities of countries and peoples’ (Ayed in AWID 2013). 
  
The political cost for the Muslim Brotherhood regime in terms of loss of public face nationally 
and internationally was immense for many reasons. First, they had continuously stressed 
that they did not run the show in government, yet, the fact that the Presidential advisor, 
Pakinam Sharkawy, went to the CSW to champion the Brotherhood’s stance on gender-
based violence exposed that they held the real policymaking power. Second, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s transnational alliances in the CSW did not seem strong enough to counter the 
transnational feminist mobilisation against them. If the Muslim Brotherhood were counting on 
their alliances with ultra-conservative right wing Christian religious groups to take their side 
and defend them, they did not receive the support they were hoping for. The foreign press 
and international feminist groups blasted the Muslim Brotherhood for their stance and made 
them the object of negative public opinion.  
 
Third, there was covert dissent from within the official Egyptian delegation. If Pakinam took 
the role of defending the government (as official delegates are supposed to), Mervat Tallawy, 
Head of the National Council for Women, took the opposite position. Informants from 
Egyptian civil society who attended the CSW said that Tallawy’s open criticism of the 
Egyptian government’s policies towards women and her exposure of the extent to which 
women’s rights were threatened was received sympathetically. Besides, Tallawy, in view of 
her former role in the Foreign Ministry, had strong allies in the upper echelons of the UN 
apparatus and the CSW, who looked favourably to her role as defender of women’s rights 
from within the Egyptian government. In effect this international space was one where she 
could exude more political influence than Pakinam Sharkawy, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
representative. The international damage to the Brotherhood’s image was considered 
sufficiently embarrassing as to merit presidential intervention, as will be discussed below.  
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The ‘Brotherhoodisation’ of state policy vis-à-vis gender issues was evident in a two-pronged 
strategy adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood. The first was to create a select corps of women 
whose agenda was congruent with that of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if they were not 
organisationally part of the movement. These women were to lead in all policy spaces by 
basically playing political musical chairs. In effect what we were observing was the 
substitution of the First Lady’s entourage under Mubarak with the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
female corps and other women with Islamist sympathies. For example, Omaima Kamel was 
a parliamentary candidate, a member of the constituent assembly delegated with the 
responsibility of drawing up the constitution, and a presidential aide to President Morsi. 
  
The second policy was to co-opt one of the institutions close to the state so that it would be 
compliant with the Brotherhood’s political agenda. Putting such a strategy in place was 
evident shortly after the CSW when President Morsi announced a new initiative at a 
conference in the Presidential palace, committed to elevating the position of Egyptian 
women. In that conference, President Morsi announced that the government plan of action to 
enhance the situation of Egyptian women would be led by the Centre for Sociological and 
Criminological Studies. Little of his speech tackled women’s issues per se, with its content 
focused mostly on launching an assault on his internal opponents against the background of 
increasing political violence against the Muslim Brotherhood and his rule.  
 
The intention behind the conference was not only to save public face on women’s issues, but 
also, to pull the carpet from beneath the feet of the National Council for Women as “the” key 
national institution delegated with addressing women’s issues in Egypt, and which clearly 
was resistant to co-option. Mervat Tallawy who was invited to the conference, was absent on 
account of being “sick”. In effect this was a move intended to replace one resistant institution 
that could not be co-opted with another one that was more amenable to yielding to the 
political will of those in power. What followed was a workshop to examine gender-based 
violence, with recommendations issued for the security apparatus on how to better handle 
assault in public spaces. Nothing else followed and the idea of a new action plan to enhance 
the status of Egyptian women was quietly buried, possibly because of a lack of genuine 
political commitment, but also because the government was forced to prioritise managing the 
growing internal dissent towards its rule.  
 
The Islamisation of state policy was also felt on the ground, though women in the focus 
groups continued to talk about two prime preoccupations: economic downfall and personal 
safety and security (al infelat al amny). In the focus groups that were undertaken in March 
2011, the fragmentation in society between women who endorsed the Islamists and those 
that didn’t had become acute and was manifest in the complete disjuncture in the 
perceptions of reality that were conveyed in two competing narratives of life in the shadow of 
the Brothers. Women belonging to the Islamist movements praised the new regime and 
pointed to the everyday forms of dissent and protest that were instigated by citizens as 
evidence of the newly won freedoms enjoyed. They argued that this was a golden era for 
women who enjoyed the freedom to express themselves without being subject to the 
repressive apparatus of the Mubarak regime. This narrative was strikingly at odds with that 
captured in other focus groups where women mentioned being under increasing pressure to 
dress in more conservative clothing while on the street. In focus groups in Giza and Qena, 
women complained that in some mosques during the Friday sermon, men were being 
encouraged to take on second wives from among the Syrian refugee population in Egypt as 
a kind of social duty. 
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5  The 30 June revolution and beyond 
 
If women were some of the biggest supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and actively 
contributed to their ascendency to power, they were also some of the most vehement 
opponents of the Brothers in the 30 June uprisings. Eventually, the threat to women’s rights 
led to the emergence of a counter-coalition along feminist lines, whose identity and strength 
were manifest on the second anniversary of the Egyptian revolution when women entered 
Tahrir Square carrying huge banners and images all about women’s rightful place in a new 
Egypt. Some of the worst acts of sexual violence were reported on that day.  
 
Since images and accounts of women who were sexually assaulted in the mass 
demonstrations that took place in Tahrir Square on the anniversary of the 25 January 
revolution were widely circulated in the media, and became a public opinion issue, there 
were doubts whether women would dare join in the 30 June revolts, or whether their families 
would forbid them. While some women spoke of wanting to join and being prevented, others 
went out with their families in large numbers. The crowds that joined the 30 June uprising in 
2013 were much larger than those that joined the 18 days of revolt in January 2011, and as a 
consequence, in terms of numbers, there were more women who participated in this second 
uprising. Women who had largely been absent from the 25 January revolution such as rural 
women, women in the provinces and Upper and Lower Egypt all participated on the 30 June. 
While women’s rights did not represent the main driver behind their mobilisation, 
nonetheless, the slogan ‘sawt al mar’a thawra mish awrah’ (a woman’s voice is a revolution 
not a depravity) was also heard, in particular in urban squares in Cairo.  
 
When on 3 July 2013 General Abdel Fattah el Sissi announced the ousting of President 
Morsi and the appointment of the Head of the Constitutional Court as the interim president, it 
was done in a public conference which was attended by figures who represented all the 
factions who had been politically marginalised during SCAF’s and Morsi’s rule. The 
representation from the National Salvation Front, the judiciary, Al-Azhar, the Coptic Orthodox 
Church, Tamarod, and the Salafi movement was intended to give the signal of a political 
settlement that was all-encompassing (the Muslim Brotherhood were invited to attend, but 
not surprisingly, declined). Sakina Fouad, a renowned non-Islamist writer was also present. It 
is believed that her representation stood for women, as she was later appointed Adly 
Mansour’s (the interim President) Councillor for Women’s Affairs.  
 
While the descriptive representation of women in policy spaces remained poor, their 
substantive representative improved dramatically. The Constituent Assembly that was 
formed to arrive at a new constitution for Egypt included 5 women out of a 50 member body. 
However, all five women were strong advocates of women’s equality and the constituency in 
favour of gender equality within the broader membership was greater than before, making it 
easier to form alliances and negotiate over exchanges of support. The Muslim Brotherhood 
were excluded from the Constituent Assembly, but not the Islamists, though their position 
had changed from being a majority to being a minority. The impact was to reduce the level of 
opposition to women’s rights within the assembly, though the “unliberating” liberals 
sometimes served as major opponents, despite their “pro-women” rhetoric.  
 
If we were to read the new constitution through a gender sensitive lens, women are 
conceivably some of its most notable winners. For the first time ever, the constitution 
stipulates that the state is committed to women holding public and senior management 
offices, to the appropriate representation of women in legislative bodies (thus endorsing the 
principle of affirmative action), and to women’s appointment in judicial bodies and authorities 
without discrimination. The clear stipulation of women’s entitlement to hold judicial positions 
without discrimination not only serves to consolidate the gains they had already made in 
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becoming judges but it effectively forces certain judiciary bodies such as the Council of State, 
who had refused to appoint women, to change their course of action.  
 
For the first time too the state commits to protecting women from all forms of violence (Article 
11 of the constitution). This is one of the battles that feminists had fought and lost in the 
previous constitution. Moreover, the same article clearly stipulates the rights of Egyptian 
citizens to pass on their nationality to their children, irrespective of their gender. While the 
decree prohibiting women from passing on their nationality to their children had been 
overturned during Mubarak’s era (albeit some qualifiers still applied), by enshrining it within 
the constitution any reversal of the law is made far more difficult. Article 180 sets a quarter of 
seats in the local council for women, again for the first time ever.  
  
True, the presence of Article 2 which stipulates that Islam is the principle source of legislation 
could be used by conservatives to undermine the idea of unqualified rights, however, any 
removal of that article would have been met with complete opposition from large segments of 
the Constituent Assembly. Article 93 stipulates the state’s commitment to international 
conventions which it has ratified, which is instrumental for women’s rights in view of Egypt’s 
ratification of CEDAW, and will leverage the constitutional premise for the state’s observance 
of women’s rights.  
 
The removal of Article 219 from the 2014 constitution jettisoned the major threat that 
conservative readings of Islamic jurisprudence would be used to justify the denial of women’s 
rights. In order to satisfy the Salafis, the preamble stated that it will be up to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court to determine the interpretation of the Sharia. The record of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court is a mixed one, at times it has produced enlightened readings, at others, 
more regressive ones. Of course the only way to ensure the odds are against conservative 
readings justifying regressive policies would be revert Article 2 to its previous phrasing, 
where the Sharia is ‘a’ source of legislation, not ‘the’ source. This was not broached in the 
Constituent Assembly as it was considered ‘a red line’ that neither the Salafis nor Al-Azhar, 
nor a wide section of the population were willing to see crossed. 
  
The process of creating consensus on these ‘gains’ for women was not an easy nor 
straightforward one. Some members of the Constituent Assembly were willing to support 
some women’s rights but not others. In other words, feminist advocates could not count on 
an approach of the indivisibility of human rights. For example, some members were willing to 
concede to having an article prohibiting violence against women but completely rejected the 
idea of quotas. Quotas were a particularly divisive issue. Professor Hoda el Sadda who 
headed the Freedoms Committee confided that the issue of quotas was often one subject to 
negotiations and bargaining between different factions rather than ideological positions per 
se. Those who endorsed having a quota for workers and farmers recognised that the bloc 
favouring a quota for women would not accept their demand unless equal recognition of the 
women’s quotas case was made. Opposition for a recognition of women’s rights came not 
only from the Islamists but also from those considered to be among the “liberals”. El Sadda 
noted that there were some unexpected people among the most vehement “liberal” 
opponents to women’s rights in the constitution. What helped however, was that the group of 
five women on the Constituent Assembly consistently and categorically championed 
women’s rights in the constitution. They also created alliances across parties and 
movements in order to create a strong front that could push its weight around.  
 
The process of drawing up the new constitution occurred in the context of a deeply divided 
nation polarised between those who hailed the rupture in the regime as a revolution against a 
theocratic dictatorship (or some versions thereof), and those who rejected the new status 
quo as illegitimate because it came into being through a military coup d’etat. These deep 
polarisations also gripped feminists in Egypt. Feminist activists who were active in the youth 
revolutionary movements that rejected the new regime rejected the constitution altogether 
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because of certain clauses giving the military special rights such as to try civilians. Women’s 
rights became of inconsequential weight for them. Those that endorsed the revolution found 
themselves vilified as endorsing a dictatorship.  
 
The fate of the Muslim Sisters under the present circumstances remains unpredictable, some 
of them have become radicalised by the ousting of President Morsi, and some have retreated 
from public life. However, what is for sure is that the security crackdown has affected them in 
deep ways. It is likely that their collective mobilisation will subside, though one off stand-ins, 
protests and marches have been sustained in different governorates at a great price for 
personal safety. 
  
The reaction of feminists to the repression of the Muslim Sisters has been mixed: some have 
stood up to defend the violation of their human rights, others have argued that their 
instrumentalisation by the Brothers and entanglement in acts of violence is morally 
unjustifiable. This has certainly added to the fractures and polarisations among feminists and 
the ethics of either stance will be a matter of debate for a long time to come. Ultimately in the 
next phase, gender justice advocates will need healing as do the rest of the Egyptian 
population in order to be able to rediscover what binds together more than what divides.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
During Mubarak’s rule, autonomous forms of activism championing gender equality survived 
in a context where they were regulated by the state security investigations apparatus, subject 
to encroachments from the National Council for Women, and lacking in the outreach 
capacities of the Islamist movements. However, attempts at working collectively were made 
through launching campaigns, joining networks and forming coalitions. While these forms of 
collective action were undermined by deep fragmentations, they nevertheless generated 
repertoires of human relations that could be activated in the right circumstances. Yet after the 
first revolution of the 25 January, an ideological assault on women’s rights was combined 
with a political will bent on the exclusion of pro-equality leaders. Two years of insidious 
backlash against women’s rights created a political necessity of stepping up collective action, 
enabled by the political opportunity of an exceptional revolutionary political culture. New 
repertoires emerged to counter gender-based violence, strengthening the collective power of 
organised action on the streets of Egypt. Many of these repertoires came to fruition in the 
lead up to the mass protests to defend women’s rights witnessed in the 30 June uprising. 
However old and new repertoires may degenerate under the pressures of fragmentation and 
political divisions. The question is whether political necessity in future will force them to 
reconfigure in new struggles to defend women’s equality.  
 
After the ousting of President Mubarak, there was a great deal of optimism on the part of 
many actors domestically and internationally that Egypt would be on the path to 
democratisation. Acting on that basis, the approach on the part of many donors and local 
NGO workers was to seek exchange of experience from other countries that have undergone 
regime change, in particular from Latin America, and to develop programmes of political 
empowerment and engaging with the youth. So far, Egypt has experienced two ruptures (25 
January 2011 and 30 June 2013) whose outcomes in terms of democratisation are still 
unknown. Hence, the idea that gender equality flourishes better in democratic settings has 
never really been tested in Egypt. However, what became clear from the first two years 
regime change phase in the country is that the Western liberal procedural tradition of 
deeming elections as the prime yardstick for democracy has failed. If voter support is the 
prime guide for legitimacy, then the Muslim Sisters who advocated for policies that would in 
effect undermine women’s rights in parliament, could rightly make a case that they were 
empowered to do so by a public who put them in power. This form of majoritarian rule led to 
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a political order where women’s rights were revoked (and that of others), in the name of the 
ballot box.  
 
One of the recurring themes in this paper is the importance of ideology, but also the 
importance of understanding political manoeuvring in understanding how gender equality 
agendas are mediated. The ideological underpinnings of the Islamist movements’ stance on 
gender issues directly influenced the policy choices they made when they assumed 
majoritarian representation in parliament and the Constituent Assembly. The strong 
ideological opposition of the Muslim Sisters to CEDAW that catalysed their decades’ long 
struggle against the document and those who endorse it did not subside, but rather grew with 
their growing political influence. However, ideology is neither absolute in its influence on the 
political choices of its followers, nor in its impact on the wider context. The Salafis 
acquiesced to the introduction of the same set of women’s rights in the Egyptian constitution 
that they had vehemently opposed only a year earlier. The decision was evidently one of 
political manoeuvring in order to secure that they did not alienate themselves from the 
centres of power. This was a classic case of de-privileging ideological creed in favour of 
political survival. 
  
Conversely, the non-Islamist political forces, who had historically been associated in the 
minds of many with an ideological commitment to gender equality were prepared to forgo 
women’s rights repeatedly during the constitution drafting process as concessions in return 
for other political gains. Perhaps one of the problems too has been the tendency to associate 
the liberals with progressive political agendas when in effect, there is a need to recognise 
that there are non-liberating liberals as well - and perhaps naming and shaming them should 
be part of a future agenda to hold them to account for the disconnect between their public 
discourse and their actual practice.  
 
One of the clear messages emerging from this study is the difference that collective action 
makes for advancing gender equality at all levels, be it policy-engagement, interventions on 
the ground, or outreach work. While the political stakes were certainly against the recognition 
of women’s political agency during SCAF’s rule, nevertheless, what enabled the acting 
government at the time to afford to ignore the demands made by women’s rights activists 
was their division and inability to represent a united front when one was needed.  
 
The difference that collective mobilisation can make in bringing gender justice issues to the 
attention of policymakers and the public was evident in the work of the informal youth 
initiatives that were organically formed from 2011-2013 to counter gender-based violence. 
Through collective action, they were able to organise highly synchronised rescue operations 
that intervened in incidents were women were at risk of sexual assault or were being 
attacked. They were also able to identify and document incidents of assault and use this 
knowledge effectively to influence public opinion locally and human rights and gender justice 
groups internationally.   
 
Moreover, alliance building with political parties and movements when pursued strategically 
has also proven to be of great success for amplifying the impact of collective work. The 
evidence from the events organised on the occasions of International Women’s Day in 2011 
and 2012 are highly indicative. In March 2011, when a small group of mostly feminists and 
women youth revolutionary forces congregated in Tahrir Square to remind the public not to 
forget women’s rights in the “new” Egypt, their small numbers and absence of men and 
women from other political groups made them vulnerable to verbal and physical attacks 
(Sholkamy 2012). When the year after, they planned for the event, drawing on the support of 
political parties and youth revolutionaries, their presence was stronger and voices were 
louder. 
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Some donors working in Egypt need to reflect on whether their policies towards gender 
justice advocates supported their efforts to build strategic alliances. For example there were 
instances in which donors pressed feminists to ‘engage more’ with the Muslim Sisters and 
the Brotherhood so as to influence policy. Whether this pressure for engaging the Islamists 
was reflective of the broader foreign policy of some of the bilateral donors or whether it 
stemmed from a belief that this was the most opportune pathway to pursue (or both), it was 
counter-productive. The strategic interests of feminists coincided by and large more with 
those of other actors, who happened to be in the opposition.  
 
This is not to suggest that collective action or alliance building are magic bullets to effecting 
positive change on the gender agenda. Sometimes a political will that is committed to gender 
justice can secure the institutionalisation of a gender just agenda ‘from above’ in ways that 
fast track the outcome of the struggles from below. The danger is the co-option of 
independent non-state actors and the closure of public spaces for mobilisation. Pressure 
from below is needed in order to ensure that informal youth based initiatives are not 
repressed or sidelined – and in order to make sure that the government is held to account for 
bringing the constitution into force. Depending on the nature of the unfolding entente 
between the authorities and the Nour party, one potential future scenario is the increasing 
formal and informal political power of the Salafi movements. Even if their formal discourse 
were to become more moderate, their informal discourses and practices are anathema to 
women’s citizenship rights, and will need to be countered through multiple forms of 
resistance.  
 
 
Key policy messages 
 
The following are eleven policy messages for international donors and policymakers 
supporting gender justice in Egypt: 
 
1 International policymakers and donors should take a non-partisan position with respect 
to the political events that occurred on 30 June 2013 
They should not endorse either the Muslim Brotherhood or the military in their 
narratives. In view of the deep divisions in position among activists, including those that 
work on gender issues, donors’ partisan positions can only worsen the situation and 
arouse suspicions over motives and agendas.  
 
2 Support coalition-building and collective action without engineering it  
There is a pressing need to ensure that the momentum of collective mobilisation 
around gender issues is not lost. This will need donors to have convening skills and 
sustained engagement with local actors in order to provide a safe space for them to 
think collectively and deepen ties and networks around common agendas. However, in 
so doing, donors must not assume a role in designing the form and membership of the 
collective groups. In practical terms, the difference is between the following two 
scenarios. The first is issuing a call for application where one of the criteria is two or 
more initiatives working together so local actors can choose each other, decide on the 
division of labour between them and present themselves as a united front. The second 
scenario is to select the partners who donors think would complement each other well 
and prod them to work together in the belief that the sum of all parts would amplify 
impact. Successful collective action must emerge organically rather than enforced in a 
top down manner - even if it is done in a participatory way. 
 31 
 
 
3 Support and strengthen the informal youth initiatives which work on gender-based 
violence in public spaces 
At the time of writing, the activism of informal youth based initiatives working on sexual 
assault in protest spaces has waned. This is to be expected in view of the fact that 
some of the initiatives’ raison d’etre such as Opantish and Tahrir Body Guards were 
specifically established to make protest spaces free from assault. Since protests have 
considerably decreased, there is a fear that, typical of social movements that have 
cycles of emergence and dissolution, some of these initiatives would also disappear. 
However, sexual assault continues and some initiatives such as Basma and Shoft 
Taharosh have redirected their efforts to other spaces where women’s bodily integrity 
is threatened, such as in public transport and the moulids. Concerted efforts are 
needed to create an enabling environment for these initiatives to thrive and grow, 
including strategic planning, capacity building and experience exchange, as well as 
funding. Caution is needed however, not to transform them into new “donor darlings”.  
 
4 Support the process of restructuring the National Council for Women, supporting the 
rotation of leadership and building its outreach and alliances  
With the downfall of the Mubarak regime, the fate of the National Council for Women 
has been put in question, in view of its strong association with the First Lady. The 
National Council for Women has proven to be an integral institution that has not lost its 
authority to engage in policy processes both domestically and internationally. During 
Morsi’s reign, it managed to escape co-option and loss of autonomy. However, it is 
time to revamp the NCW, bring in new faces, new capabilities and new visions. In view 
of the central role that donors have played in supporting the NCW both in terms of 
general policy as well as funding, they are well positioned to play a supportive role in 
restructuring the NCW to make it fit for purpose.  
 
5 Build a consortium of donors to work on FGM as part and parcel of a broader agenda 
on rural community health  
While the Mubarak regime’s record in protecting women’s rights left much to be 
desired, one of the successful initiatives in terms of eliciting positive social change was 
the experience of the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (which has since 
then been brought under the umbrella of the National Population Council) in 
addressing female genital mutilation. However, their outreach was rather limited and 
approaches were lacking in innovation. It is perhaps time for donors to collectively pool 
funds for supporting a 10 to 15 year plan of action to eliminate FGM as part of a long-
term rural health improvement initiative that would benefit vulnerable women, men and 
children in poor communities.  
 
6 Press the Egyptian authorities to adopt a gendered approach to human security 
The Egyptian authorities’ approach to security during this current phase has been 
through the war on terrorism. However, human security in terms of putting at the centre 
citizens’ priorities and needs for safety and personal security has continued to be 
deprioritised (although as suggested above, it has got significantly worse since 2011). 
At this critical juncture, in view of the thorny relations with the West, it is unlikely that 
the Egyptian government will be responsive to external calls for security sector reform, 
even if it is necessary to address the structural causes of the country’s poor record on 
human security. However, one entry point for making modest progress on human 
security which has been consistently at the top of Egyptians’ concerns, is to adopt a 
gender lens to framing human security issues when engaging in policy dialogue with 
the Egyptian authorities. For example, more and better trained police officers should be 
placed in the subway stations in order to make these spaces safe for women. As one 
of the key subway stops was closed (as a security measure to prevent protestors from 
congregating in Tahrir Square), other stops have suffered from extreme overcrowding 
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which has created an environment conducive to the increased sexual harassment of 
women. 
 
7 Support local efforts to redress the cultural backlash against women  
Donors can support initiatives that use soft power to redress the setbacks that the 
country has experienced over the past three years with respect to girls’ and women’s 
wellbeing. These setbacks include, although are not restricted to: 
 
 an increase in school drop outs and reduced attendance 
 and increased social acceptance of early marriage 
 conflicting messages regarding the necessity of FGM 
  
8 Donors should make a large grant to the Egyptian government to implement the 
constitutional commitment to providing for poor female-headed households through a 
temporary scheme of conditional cash transfers.  
At this critical juncture in which employment opportunities are scarce, conditional cash 
transfers may be a positive, albeit temporary, measure to prevent further deterioration 
in the economic well-being of the Egyptian family and to provide women with 
opportunities for positive social engagement (be it literacy, skills training or participation 
in developmental programmes).  
 
9 Continue to build bridges between Egyptian local activists and transnational feminist 
and human rights platforms and networks.  
Such links have proven to be invaluable in knowledge sharing, and whistle blowing on 
the violation of women’s rights, and solidarity. It may be helpful to adopt a plan for 
mutual increased engagement and exposure between local and transnational actors.  
 
10 Donors should continue to diversify the actors that they are supporting in civil society 
The 25 January revolution revealed the extent to which the usual suspects that donors 
have been engaging with for decades may not be the movers and shakers on the 
ground. Among many donors there was a realisation of the need for a new approach 
that recognises youth as leaders rather than objects of interventions. However, despite 
the rhetoric of supporting youth-led activism, there has been very little to indicate that a 
policy shift has materialised (Moustafa 2010). While the diversification of actors is by 
no means an easy or automatic process, there is a need for evidence-based research 
that explores how working with unusual suspects can be developed without 
undermining the agreed upon criteria for partnerships informing donor policy.  
 
11 In addition to the diversification of actors, donors also need to diversify the themes that 
they support under the gender rights agenda 
There has been a disproportionate focus on political rights at the expense of social and 
economic rights. While both are needed, initiatives associated with conditional cash 
transfers, educational reform, and reproductive rights are badly needed.  
 
 
Key policy messages for non-state local actors 
engaged in initiatives to support gender justice  
 
1 At the time of writing (March 2014), the political mood and public opinion was not very 
acquiescent of civil society or spaces for organic, spontaneous civic activism. However, 
in view of the fact that many of the innovations in promoting women’s equality 
witnessed in the revolutionary phase of January 2011-June 2013 emerged from the 
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bottom up through street activism, it is of paramount importance that spaces for citizen 
engagement be protected. While the onus rests on the government which has the 
power to enhance or restrict political freedoms, creative ways of subverting and 
circumventing inhibitions in order to create safe spaces are needed. 
 
2 Work collaboratively with counsellors, psychologists and experts on processes of 
healing and coming to terms with the violent ruptures that Egypt has witnessed over 
the course of the past few years. The aim of such initiatives would also be to support a 
healing process among advocates of gender justice, in order to work through the 
divisions and polarisations that have created fissures between people and examine the 
opportunities for finding common ground around collective action on particular 
campaigns.  
 
3 Hold the government accountable for the fulfilment of its obligations to eliminate 
violence against women, including the issuance of a new law, the reform of the existing 
penal code, the rehabilitation of security officers, and nationwide programmes that 
address private and public forms of violence.  
 
4 Provide a number of possible scenarios for the restructuring of the NCW and also put 
forward a number of names that would show diversity in backgrounds, experience and 
skill sets to the institution.  
 
5 Work with different stakeholders to design and implement a nationwide plan for 
identifying women with strong leadership skills, a strong social/gender justice agenda, 
and a community base to help them and their teams to prepare for local council 
elections, and to ensure that capable women are able to take advantage of the new 
gender quota.  
 
6 In line with the constitutional commitment to provide for poor female-headed 
households, local activists should press the government to implement conditional cash 
transfers that are tied to participation in programmes that support the women’s well-
being. Local development actors with strong community links may be well-equipped to 
undertake participatory needs assessments and, in conjunction with feminist 
organisations, influence the design, monitoring and evaluation of such programmes.  
 
7 Use soft power for public outreach. While Egyptian society has tended to be by and 
large patriarchal, the level of misogyny seems to have increased in the past three 
years (at least according to the accounts of women in the focus groups that we 
engaged with who do not have an Islamist political orientation). It will take years to 
undo the impact of the backlash against women’s rights politically, economically and 
socially. Innovative approaches that engage the public through culture and media are 
needed in order to challenge some of the ideas, values and perceptions that 
undermine women’s agency and distort relations with men. This may for example 
include soap operas, films, cartoons, and the use of social media.  
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